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The purpose of this research is to analyse the differences in chief executive officer 
(CEO) pay-to-performance sensitivity in family and non-family controlled firms. The 
corporate governance literature argues that CEOs in family businesses have superior 
incentives with regards to maximizing firm performance and therefore require less 
compensation-based incentives. In order to validate such assumptions, an analysis was 
carried out to test whether family CEOs´ total compensation and performance-based 
incentives are lower than in non-family controlled firms. Employing a fixed effects panel data 
regression on a sample of 80 firms it is shown that neither total pay nor equity-based 
compensation seems to be affected by the ownership structure of the firm. Furthermore, the 
change in the compensation scheme for a firm that replaced a family CEO with a non-family 
executive was studied. The case study suggests that family controlled firms should increase 
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Section I - Introduction 
Finding the most efficient compensation practices that mitigate agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders in companies has been widely addressed in corporate finance 
literature. The underlying assumption is that conflicts of interest and their inherent costs arise 
when one party (the agent) performs work delegated to it by another (the principal). In large 
public listed corporations, it is even harder or costly for shareholders to monitor the 
performance of its managers. With this said, specific compensation practices, particularly 
equity-based pay, have been developed to overcome this principal-agent cost and align 
interests between managers and their control of the firm, and shareholders and the ownership 
of the company. 
Both traditionally and recently, evidence has shown family-run organisations as the 
preeminent form of business across the world (e.g. Colli et al., 2013). In the United States 
(“U.S.”) alone, family-run companies contribute at least around 30% of the gross domestic 
product (“GDP”), which employs approximately 27% of the national workforce (Astrachan & 
Shanker, 2003). Within the domain of publicly traded companies, the emphasis of the present 
research, family businesses comprise over 35% of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index
1
 
companies (“S&P 500”) (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). These statistics show not only how 
significant family-firms are in the economic sphere, but also the potential consequences of 
agency problems between owners and managers. 
This paper aims to contribute to this debate by employing panel collected between 2000 
and 2010 for a sample of companies listed on the S&P 500. Given the aforementioned weight 
of family business in the U.S. stock markets, they offer suitable and interesting range of 
                                                 
1 
The S&P 500 is a market value weighted index of the biggest 500 U.S. large cap stocks and is designed to be a 
leading indicator of U.S. equities universe. 
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companies (including sector diversity) in which to study how family ownership combined 
with control influences executive compensation schemes. 
Over this article, the analysis carried out considers cash compensation, equity-based 
compensation and total compensation as compensation components. In addition, the pay-to-
performance sensitivity will be measure by Delta
2
. By engaging a test of difference of means 
it is possible to investigate the fluctuations of compensation structure that companies use to 
incentive CEOs, whereas a fixed effect model is used to control for firm and CEO 
characteristics and study the significance of total compensation that arises from either cash or 
equity compensation. Thus, the evolution of the compensation scheme of Tellabs Inc 
(“Tellabs”) is analysed to assess the impact of CEO replacements. The company provides a 
real case of a family controlled firm who replaces its CEO by a non-family CEO, and also the 
reverse action, being a key analysis to understand how compensation schemes actually 
change.  
The interaction between the family´s control and the executive´s compensation for their 
management can contribute to ease agency conflicts. While compensation should be engaged 
to align interests between shareholders and managers, family involvement provides a clear 
incentive to control management and ensure that they perform in the best interest of 
shareholders. Nevertheless, the positive impact generated by family control on reducing 
agency problems may create an adverse effect on compensation packages. Family members 
in their proprietary firms tend to have a deeper involvement in their company's operational 
and strategic activities than institutional owners. Such position of power
3
 might be translated 
into a possibility of extracting private benefits from the company and use them for personal 
or family purposes, which can result in different compensation practices to those of non-
family companies.  
                                                 
2 
Delta is the sensitivity of annual equity-based to changes in stock price and is defined along Section ӀӀӀ. 
3 
In terms of voting shares and inside knowledge.  
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In agreement with the above, it is central to examine how family ownership affects 
executive compensation policies of their firms, particularly CEOs. It is also imperative to 
distinguish family firms where the CEO belongs to the family since the employment of a 
family member for this key position is expected to have an influence on compensation levels 
and structure. Likewise, generational issues may impact remuneration practices
4
 but this 
debate is beyond the scope of the research herein due to limitations on gathering enough 
information. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these various managerial features do not have the same 
effect, it is reasonable to deduct a reflection of such relevant factors in executive 
compensation. Recent studies of both executive compensation and family businesses have 
been less attempted to analyse and understand the impacts of family control incentives
5
 
within CEOs compensation.   
The primary aim of this study is to develop an empirical approach to better 
understanding how family representation affects CEO compensation and provide fresh and 
deeper insights to such a broad academic theme. Studying compensation policies in family 
business is important as it allows drawing inferences over agency costs theory and better 
understanding of CEO motivations towards maximizing firm performance.  
Main results do not confirm that family firms which employ an active executive family 
member show a clear preference for cash-pay which indicates a possible expropriation 
problem. Moreover, total compensation in family-controlled firms is not significantly 
different as well as they do not show a lower propensity to use equity-based compensation 
than widely held companies. Notwithstanding, when analysing a particular case of family-
controlled business that replaces its CEO, conclusions attained may suggest that that family-
                                                 
4 
As descendants might view compensation practices in a different way (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
5 Family control incentives are perceived as the different incentives one family CEO receives for being in 
control of his own company or the family company that may lead to different compensation packages.     
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controlled firms have to pay nonfamily CEOs more to incentive them to perform at the same 
level that a family CEO would do. 
The paper continue as follows: Section II presents a review of relevant literature 
regarding executive compensation under family firms and develops the hypothesis to be 
tested; In Section III, data, sample and methodology is described; Section IV explains the 
main results obtained from the regression analysis; Section V examines the evolution of 
Tellabs executive compensation package to analyse the changes around CEO replacements; 




Section II - Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
Executive compensation is one of the broadest domains covered by corporate 
governance studies and is described as one of the solutions to mitigate the principal-agent 
conflict (Holmstrom, 1979). The latter conflicts arise when the shareholders and managers 
pursue different goals and the shareholders find it challenging or costly to monitor the 
performance of the managers (McConaughy, 2000) in order to reach their intended goals. The 
costs arising from such disputes can be mitigated by introducing compensation mechanisms 
to re-align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. Many academics have 
tried to model compensation to produce optimal contracts that work in practice. 
Notwithstanding, a consensus is yet to be reached. The modern literature on the problem 
dates back as far as Berle & Means (1932), then built upon by Jensen & Meckling (1976), 
Fama (1980), and Fama & Jensen (1983) to make notable contributions in providing 
explanatory frameworks for this important management cost. The most agreeable solution 
found was to offer CEOs enough cash compensation to keep them from seeking employment 
elsewhere (Fama, 1980), combined with very high levels of stock-based compensation that 
co-aligns their decision making with shareholders’ long-term interests (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990 a). Nonetheless, in companies with large shareholder bases, namely like family owned 
businesses, this may not necessarily be the case. 
The potential benefits associated with the presence of a majority shareholder were first 
studied by Berle & Means (1932). The authors concluded that a concentration of ownership 
creates considerable incentives to control management due to the vested interest that is a 
large proportion of their wealth invested in the company. However, studies carried out by 
Demsetz (1983) or Himmelberg et al. (1999) claim that ownership concentration does not 
significantly influence firm performance. Since companies differ in many aspects, 
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shareholders should choose the form of ownership that better mitigates their particular agency 
costs and co-aligns their interests.  
It is commonly presumed that companies with a large majority shareholder can have 
lower, or at least not aggravated, classic agency problems, resulting in reduced agency costs. 
On the other hand, this type of ownership structure can raise a new issue, the extraction of 
private benefits. The potential upside of having a large shareholder might be overlapped by 
decisions that foster personal profit and disregard, or even jeopardize the company 
performance. Despite being extremely difficult to quantify, Grossman & Hart (1980) research 
conclude that expropriation of private benefits is a problem that should be taking into 
consideration by the large majority shareholders. Nonetheless, for family controlled firms, the 
expropriation effect should be evaluated taking into account stewardship behaviours. As 
reported by Davis et al. (1997), family members might take advantage from other non-
financial benefits, which can result in reduced incentives to expropriate private benefits.  
From a theoretical point of view, the predominant family effect on executive 
compensation is still not clear. Depending on the characteristics of the organization both can 
have significant impact on the structure and level of compensation of its executives. Close 
monitoring by shareholders will result in better alignment of interests with managers, leading 
to the possibility of lower remuneration levels or less use of incentive-based components. 
Conversely, the extraction of private benefits can result in either higher non-variable 





Section II.I - Ownership structure and CEO compensation 
Dispersion between shareholders and managers is a primary cause of agency problems. 
Murphy (1999) studied dispersed ownership across U.S. firms and concluded that managers 
have enough discretion to pursue their own goals which may lead to several compensation 
distortions such as excessive pay levels or low levels of performance-based remuneration. 
Following this argument, Tosi et al. (2000) found evidence of disciplinary effects of 
concentrated ownership over executive compensation. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) were among the first to analyse executive compensation in 
U.S. publicly listed companies. Despite compensation levels being quite similar, the authors 
find that compensation packages offered by such firms are generally more linked to firm 
performance. This evidence support the idea that a major shareholder has higher willingness 
to offer incentives that align management interests through better monitoring and 
compensation mechanisms. In line with this result, Shleifer & Vishny (1986) show that the 
presence of large shareholders leads to better management monitoring and reduces 
managerial discretion.  
It is therefore expected that increased monitoring also affects a CEO ability to influence 
the executive compensation package. A number of studies including Hambrick & Finkelstein 
(1995), Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al. (2006) report that concentrated ownership have a 
dampening effect on executive compensation levels. Hartzell & Starks (2003) go even further 
and extend a negative relation with institutional ownership. However, the evidences found 
can always be argued over the previous premise: shareholders should choose the form of 




Section II.II - Family control and CEO compensation  
Evidence from across the globe has shown family organizations as the dominant form of 
business which turns family ownership and control into a particular interesting topic in 
corporate governance fields. When analysing these, Jensen & Meckling (1976) defend that 
such businesses are sheltered from agency costs based on the premise that ownership and 
management overlap. Nevertheless, most recent literature argues the presence of agency 
problems in family businesses (Schulze et al., 2001 or Chrisman et al., 2007). Since such 
costs tend to be lower in family firms than in non-family ones (Chrisman et al., 2004), there 
is already a hint that compensation levels and components might be different for both types 
of businesses. 
At first sight, it is possible to understand why the family form of business it is not 
necessarily the less effective organizational structure (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Bertrand & 
Schoar (2006) indicate that family CEOs have different incentives for managing their 
companies. Wright & Kellermanns (2011) analyse the monitoring and disciplinary costs 
arising from such form of businesses and conclude that they are in fact very low. Combined 
with increased attitudes of stewardship, which widen investment time horizons and improve 
firm performance, Anderson & Reeb (2003) suggest that family businesses may not have the 
less effective organizational governance than non-family ones. Conversely, the downside of 
family ownership must equally be taken into consideration. Value destroying behaviours 
could emerge from actions of irresponsible leadership, expropriation from minority 
shareholders, hubris
6
, and excessive risk-taking. Villalonga & Amit (2006) defend that the 
shift in agency problems from concerns between shareholders and management (principal-
agent) to potential issues between the family and other shareholders (principal-principal) 
provides a foundation for understanding the impact of family representation in public firms. 
                                                 
6 
Overestimation of an individual´s own competence, accomplishments or capabilities, especially when the 
person exhibiting it is in a position of power. 
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Notwithstanding, we can have family firms which are not directly controlled by the family, 
i.e., they have a non-family CEO (McConaughy, 2000).  
McConaughy (2000) examines compensation in family controlled firms by comparing a 
family CEOs against non-family CEOs. The evidence suggests that family CEOs receive 
lower total remuneration and less performance-based compensation. The author also 
concludes that family businesses have to pay more to attract good external managers. Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2003) validate such hypothesis by studying total compensation inside family 
organizations and comparing results between family and non-family CEOs. Conclusions 
attained dictate lower total compensation values for family member CEOs with the difference 
in the correlation further growing as family ownership share increases. Consistent with such 
results is Combs et al. (2010) research which also defend that compensation of family CEOs 
is dependent on the number of active family members within the company. Their research 
establishes that compensation for family firms with one active family member increases by 
56% in relation to other companies. However, if multiple family members are active, 
compensation decreases by 13%. This indicates that family members control and monitor 
their executives’ remuneration. 
 In contrast, there are also additional family-CEO characteristic behaviours that can 
generate opposite incentives. An executive position comes with great amount of discretion, 
especially when involving voting rights within the company. It is then more complex for the 
board to effectively control CEOs who have more freedom to follow their instincts and 
impulses. Faccio et al. (2001), Schulze et al. (2001) and Morck & Yeung (2003) studied the 
relation between voting power inside family firms and claims that CEOs with a higher share 
of the votes have higher probabilities of abusing their power either by extracting resources 
from the company or by hiring colleagues or relatives. Moreover, poor stewardship may also 
be a concern. Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996) discuss how CEOs who also own their business 
have a higher tendency to become too emotionally attached to their business and start 
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pursuing personal ambitions in lieu of company goals. Consequences associated with such 
behaviours normally leads to a higher likelihood of risk-taking that can easily lead to strategic 
stagnation or even losses (Block, 2009). 
If the CEO belongs to the controlling family, one may obtain more than financial 
benefits such as family status, community recognition or even provide employment for other 
family members and friends. Davis & Taguiri (1989), Stafford et al. (1999) and Olson et al. 
(2003) state that family CEOs aim to achieve a combination of financial and non-financial 
goals that can differ from what is normally assumed. The pursuit of non-financial objectives 
can be translated into stewardship behaviours, one of the most relevant incentives associated 
with owner management. Davis et al. (1997) show that stewardship incentives for leading and 
elevate the family name, fortune and reputation that characterize family CEOs by having 
long-run oriented management techniques and superior commitment to do what is needed to 
make strengthen the business.  
Stewardship, in opposition to agency costs which imply that individuals in higher 
hierarchical positions will exploit it to enrich themselves, considers the altruistic side of 
executive decisions. Davis et al. (1997) suggest that individuals do not always entirely follow 
their own self-interests, also being motivated by altruism, generosity or loyalty. As Arregle et 
al. (2007) highlight, families do care more about their companies than non-family employers 
managing companies for third parties. Family firms are part of family identity and patrimony, 
being its reputation and wealth depended on the performance of the company. Adding to this 
the fact that professionalism and perception of the family within its social environment are 
also directly linked to the business, strong incentives to behave in a way that is not purely 
self-centred arise (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Based on these characteristics, family 
CEOs might behave as pro-organization stewards rather than purely financial oriented, 
paying themselves lower compensation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
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The CEO tenure at family-run public traded businesses is also an important factor that 
might help explaining compensation differences. Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2006) presents 
an average tenure range between 15 and 25 years, a higher interval when compared to the 3 to 
4 years of non-family controlled business. The interpretation of such differences suggests that 
family CEOs feel quite sheltered in their job position and perform with expectations of 
having a long-term placement. Jacobs (1991) defends that family leaders are usually secure 
enough in their position, allowing less risky short-term decisions to deliver results to the 
governing board. In fact, an interesting finding by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) argues that one 
of the plausible causes for lower family-CEO total compensation can be the greater 
importance given to prudence against business risk.  
Alongside family-CEO tenures, the job security argument also relates to longer 
investment horizons. Laverty (1996), James (1999) and Hoopes & Miller (2006) reveal that 
family CEOs are more likely to dedicate a substantial part of the business investment plan in 
research, training and development of the best infrastructures to increase and sustain good 
returns over their prospectively lengthy career. Indeed, some research shows evidence that 
family CEOs do outspend non-family peers in R&D (Weber et al., 2003) and capital 
investments in plant, property and equipment (Kang, 2000). Miller & Le Breton-Miller 
(2006) concluded that results from stewardship behaviours, long-run investment horizon 
avoiding short-term management added with more R&D, training, and capital expenditure, 
allows family-controlled firms a better chance to develop higher long-term financial results.  
Jensen & Murphy (1990b) and Sanders (2001) agree that a CEO is a central resource 
allocator, a decision-making player, and that shareholders boards influence CEOs to make 
pro-shareholder decisions through their remuneration. In line with this argument one can 
expect that executive compensation is likely to be a factor heavily affected by family 
influence. Based on these family-CEO characteristics and motivations, the family control 
incentive predicts that founding-family CEOs have greater incentives for maximizing firm 
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performance derived from their relation to the firm and the exclusive perks available to them. 
This would translate in less need for performance-based compensation. 
Consensus is elusive within the literature available on the correlation between family 
ownership and compensation. Family ownership tends to have a negative relation with family 
CEOs compensation, favoring the notion that remuneration is less important as an incentive 
alignment mechanism. A family bond seems to mitigate agency costs, monitor the CEO and 
provides evidence of non-expropriation of minority shareholders. Nonetheless, some studies 
offset these findings and establish positive relations between compensation and family 
ownership. The explanation might be once again found in abuse of power and private benefit 
extraction. Either a family member is CEO and extracts private benefits in form of higher pay 
or outside CEOs are dominated by family members and let them expropriate minority 
shareholders.  
Observing that only a few studies explore the distinction between family controlled firms 
and otherwise, it provides to this piece of research the opportunity to shed some light on this 
topic by analysing CEOs' compensation levels, structure and pay-to-performance sensitivity. 
When having a non-family CEO inside a family firm it is not accurate to assume that said 
individual possesses the same incentives and generates the same agency costs as if it was a 
family member. The majority of past family literature with regards to the impact of family 
control on compensation packages argues that incentives are strong enough to increase CEO 
monitoring. This generates expectations towards the possibility of family CEOs to receive 
lower total compensation when compared with non-family CEOs:  





In accordance to previous research on compensation structure, the intention of this 
research is towards demonstrating that it might also be different among family and non-
family controlled firms. Block (2008) uses a Bayesian approach to analyse compensation 
structure inside family firms and non-family firms. The author found that family CEOs 
receives a higher fraction of compensation in base salary and a lower part in stock-options 
when compared to outside CEOs. Hypothesis two can then be described as: 
Hypothesis 2: The compensation structure of family CEOs is different than that of 
nonfamily CEOs. 
In line with hypothesis two, Block (2008) also ascertains that pay-to-performance 
relation is weaker in family-managed companies despite presenting high levels. As discussed 
before, one benefit from having family-controlled firms is the fact that owners and 
management becomes only one person as the founder or a relative to the founder is, at the 
same time, the CEO of the company. Subject to further discussion about family firm and 
family-controlled firm definitions, many owner-managers have the power, incentive, and 
knowledge to lead the company. The subsequent reduction in free-rider agency costs derived 
by intrinsic motivators can generate superior incentives towards interest co-alignment. It is 
then expected that by introducing family control into family firms, the dispute of 
management and ownership interests will less probable. As family CEOs are closely tied to 
their firms, they would have less need for compensation-based incentives:  
Hypothesis 3: The compensation of family CEOs is less sensitive to performance than 




Section III - Data, Sample and Methodology 
In this research detailed breakdown of CEO pay components data that follows recently 
expanded disclosure rules
7
 is gathered in order to carry out a complete comparative analysis 
of executive compensation inside family and non-family firms. The analysis covers 
companies listed on the S&P 500 between fiscal year 2000 and 2010. The primary source of 
compensation data for U.S. CEOs is S&P´s ExecuComp database, while the accounting and 
market data were drew from Compustat. All companies without complete compensation and 




 firms have been 
removed as such firms have specific compensation characteristics that could bias the results. 
The omission of all companies being listed in the S&P500 index during less than three years 
of the total time frame used is another restriction used to reduce bias effects. Such an 
assumption avoids data anomalies coming from internal promotions, partial-year 
compensations, signing bonuses or grants conceived to outside hired CEOs. As a result, the 
starting sample is based on 417 companies. 
Furthermore, the sample is split into family and non-family firms using the list published 
by BusinessWeekMagazine (2003). This publication ranks the top 100 family businesses 
inside the S&P 500, providing helpful qualitative information about the ownership structures 
and management compositions of the family firms sub-sample. Similar indices such as the 
Fortune 500 or the Family Business Index have been widely employed to compare family and 
non-family firms, for example, in terms of financial performance (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). Regarding the particular time period selection, it is intentionally considered to match 
the referred magazine analysis. However, since there was no information available regarding 
family firms in the year 2000, it is assumed that all the companies listed in such list of 2003 
                                                 
7 New disclosure rules redefined certain compensation components, in particular bonuses that are now classified 
as non-equity compensation.    
8 Companies with standard industrial classification (“SIC”) code between 6000 and 6999. 
9
 Companies with SIC code between 4900 and 4999. 
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would be family controlled in 2000. A 10 year period is chosen with the purpose of providing 
enough length to perform a consistent regression analysis and draw reasonable conclusions.  
In order to perform the referred data split it is crucial to define what a family business is 
and identify which companies match that criteria. This step constitutes one of the major 
concerns
10
 of past studies, creating divergences among researchers. To what extend should a 
business be considered as family owed? Shanker & Astrachan (1996) draw attention to the 
difficulty of defining a family business accurately and a satisfactory definition of family firm 
is yet to be found (Astrachan et al., 2002). 
General definitions of family businesses dictate that families should aggregate effective 
control of strategic direction with the intention of retaining firm ownership, with or without 
great direct participation. As to achieve higher research specification, the definition of 
family-owned firm was narrowed down to include only those in which ownership of founding 
family is bigger than five percent or when a member of the founding family is present on the 
board. Such classification is in line with the one used by Anderson & Reeb (2003) and 
BusinessWeekMagazine (2003) providing foundations for the sample division of this 
research.  
Using the above definition, the final sample is established by the 80 firms identified as 
being family businesses. However, to analyse the full spectrum of family impact, the sample 
is breakdown into family controlled and non-controlled firms in which control is 
characterized as a family that actively impacts the management of its firm. In this study, 
control will be perceived as having a CEO that belongs to the founding/owning family.
                                                 
10
 The concern of defining family ownership is essentially an endless process. Restrictive and inclusive 
definitions have been employed across literature. Among the most recent is the one provided by the European 
Commission in the document "Overview of Family-Business-Relevant Issues: Research, Networks, Policy 
Measures and Existing Studies" (November, 2009) which combines the dimension of ownership rights and 
presence of family members in the top management positions of the company. Most of the time family 
businesses definition tends to be very detailed. As far as historical studies are considered, the requirements of 
the definition can often hardly be met given the lack of information available about voting rights, or decision-
making rights. The consequence is that different assumptions might lead to different results. 
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The distinction is obtained by conducting research over each company CEO track record and 
analyse weather it belongs or not to the founding or owning family. 216 family controlled-
firms observations across the sample period are specified, allowing better inference regarding 
which factors are responsible for hypothetical executive compensation differences between 
family and non-family CEOs. Nonetheless, the referred concerns have to be taken into 
account when using such family definition as different assumptions might lead to different 
conclusions.  
After defining the sample and the time period, the different components of executive 
compensation for each CEO are calculated: Salary, Bonus, Stock Option, Restricted Stock 
and Long Term Incentive Awards (LTIAs). The resultant summary statistics, represented 
in Table 1, includes 4,124 firm-year observations that have complete data for all 
components. The value of options is computed using the Black-Scholes model which uses 
exercise price and option term data from ExecuComp. Cash compensation is defined as the 
sum of salary and bonus and total compensation as the sum of all defined 
components. Additionally, the statistics about the proportion of total compensation that 
comes from each pay component are also calculated. Details about the calculation of all 
compensation variables are provided in Appendix. 
In order to measure compensation incentives, the sensitivity of annual equity-based to 
changes in stock price (Delta) is computed following Guay (1999). Delta_c is measured as 
the change in the value of the CEO's annual equity-based compensation for a 1% change in 
the stock price and Delta_t as the sensitivity for the CEO's total portfolio of current and 
outstanding prior grants of shares and options
11
. To determine whether family CEOs 
compensation levels differ from that of non-family CEOs, this research makes use of the tests 
of mean differences and multidimensional panel data regression model. 
                                                 
11 Core & Guay (2002) methodology was used to both computations. Also both incentive measures were 
winsorized only at the 99
th
 percentile and not also at 1st percentile since these variables are truncated at zero. 
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 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all annual compensation variables while 
Table 2 illustrates the same statistics for the family controlled and non-family control 
division. Table 1 reports a total annual compensation average of c. $10.8 million wherein 
only c. $2.1 million derive from cash compensation. In dollar terms, stock options are, on 
average, the most significant component of compensation levels while salary is the less 
important one. Nevertheless, observing the median (50
th
 percentile), a typical CEO simply 
earns c. $6.6 million but then again has options as the largest compensation component. 
Statistics about the breakdown of total compensation components are also provided. On 
average, options represent almost 40% of CEOs` total compensation, which is about the same 
value resultant from the median percentile.  
Table 1 also shows summary statistics for CEO incentive measure, Delta. Throughout 
the 10 year average, the change in CEO annual equity-based pay (Delta_c) is equal to c. 
$122.2 thousand per 1% stock price change. Moreover, the same stock price variation implies 
an average change of c. 2.8 million over the full portfolio of equity holdings (Delta_t). 
Notwithstanding, when analysing the average CEO, incentives are less sensitive which 
represents a more realistic view over the market average of pay-to-performance sensitivity.  
With the purpose of controlling for the full range of factors that influence compensation, 
other potential control variables are taken into consideration. These factors can be divided in 
variables related with company´s characteristics and those that describe CEO characteristics. 
The first set of factors is related to firm characteristics, empirically known to affect the level 
of CEO remuneration as point out by prior evidence in U.S. studies (e.g. Devers et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, individual CEO characteristics, which are widely employed in 
compensation research, are expected to be systematically different in family versus non-
family businesses. Nevertheless, such features are proven to be statistically not relevant as 
shown by Fernandes et al. (2013). At any case, such characteristics were included in the 
control variables set. 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
Contains a summary statistics for all variables employed in the analysis over the entire 
sample period. The sample consists of 4,127 firm-year observations over fiscal years 2000 
through 2010 and all the variables are described along Section ӀӀӀ and on the Appendix. 
Control variables have a slightly reduced sample size as both firm specific and individual 
CEO characteristics are not available for some of the compensation data. 









Level of CEO compensation (thousands of dollars) 
Salary 4,127 996.094 516.461 750.000 964.000 1,155.000 
Bonus 4,127 1,028.117 2,410.587 0.0 370.337 1,363.500 
Stock Option 4,127 5,089.121 13,765.712 357.676 2,321.257 5,499.796 
Restricted Stock 4,127 2,117.217 4,183.420 0.0 16.120 2,901.600 
LTIAs 4,127 1,493.400 10,299.316 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Compensation 4,127 10,759.984 18,228.674 3,677.013 6,554.694 11,791.555 
Cash Compensation 4,127 2,060.246 2,591.975 991.800 1,445.625 2,425.000 
 Percentage of CEO compensation 
P_Salary  4,124 0.213 0.219 0.088 0.144 0.238 
P_Bonus  4,124 0.126 0.172 0.0 0.062 0.196 
P_Option  4,124 0.394 0.306 0.080 0.389 0.642 
P_RS  4,124 0.210 0.274 0.0 0.005 0.387 
P_LTIAs  4,124 0.056 0.158 0.0 0.0 0.0 
              
Delta (thousands of dollars) 
Delta_c 4,127 122.235 217.152 32.006 70.369 137.304 
Delta_t 4,127 2,780.874 14,581.931 314.026 648.728 1,426.597 
              
Other Variables 
      Sales (billions of dollars) 4,127 8.780 1.270 7.868 8.714 9.611
Leverage (%) 4,103 0.232 0.169 0.113 0.220 0.323 
ROA (%) 4,121 0.156 0.089 0.103 0.151 0.201 
Shareholder Return (%) 4,061 10.055 39.763 0.299 1.801 6.360 
Stock Return Volatility (%) 4,127 0.384 0.200 0.248 0.334 0.457 
Gender 4,127 0.981 0.138 1 1 1 
Tenure  4,078 6.898 6.188 3 5 9 





The natural logarithm of sales in billions of dollars corresponds to the firm size 
parameter. As standard practice, the logarithmic form of the variable Sales is used to reduce 
heteroscedasticity (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Murphy (1999) observes a significant positive 
relation between firm size and compensation. The increase of businesses size in recent years 
is pointed out by Tosi et al. (2000) as the main driver of contemporaneous CEO 
compensation increases.  
Regarding industry effects, Westhead & Crowling (1998) defend that family firms are 
over-represented in some industries and that such characteristics may expose CEO 
compensation to industry patterns. Consistent with Anderson & Reeb (2004) prior research, 
SIC code dummy variables were used to control for industry effects. Also, year dummy 
variables were used to control for effects that may relate to specific events of the sample 
(year effects). 
Generally, companies with high leverage situations have higher likelihood of go into 
financial distress. However, the effect of such control variable remains uncertain. In one 
hand, Madura et al. (1996) defend a positive relation arguing that higher probability of 
distress is linked to higher risk which in turn leads to an increase in CEO remuneration to 
compensate for the additional risk. On the other hand, John (1993) found that equity-based 
remuneration has a negative relation to leverage as a consequence of agency costs of debt
12
. 
The leverage variable formula employed is book value of long term plus current debt divided 
by total assets. 
For firm performance measures, return on assets (“ROA”) is selected as an accounting 
performance indicator while Shareholder Returns is for controlling market-based 
performance. ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets and shareholder returns is 
measured as the change in stock price over the year plus dividends paid, divided by the stock 
                                                 
12
 The agency cost of debt arises due to different interests between shareholders and debt-holders.  
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price at the start of the year (Combs et al., 2009). Jensen & Murphy (1990 a, 1990 b) defend 
that compensation should be closely dependent on performance. The monetary incentive 
positive relation goes in line with the interest alignment mechanism discussed before. 
As discussed before, the level of risk has also an impact over compensation. However, it 
is not clear whether it is positively or negatively. Empirically, Core et al. (1999) find a 
negative relation supported by their results of decreasing CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
when risk increases. In opposition, Linck et al. (2009) defend the opposite, arguing that 
riskier companies are offering more equity-based compensation to managers as to mitigate 
agency theory costs. Therefore, Core et al. (1999) methodology was used which employs 
Stock Return Volatility as annualized standard deviation of daily stock return, which capture 
the riskiness of the company. 
 CEO characteristics were also considered due to the possibility of influencing 
compensation packages. Lippert and Moore (1994) defend that as CEO get older, they are 
less affected by labour market pressures, increasing the importance of rewarding such CEO 
with higher equity-based incentives. Conversely, Gray & Cannella (1997) conclude that older 
CEOs have higher risk-averse sentiments. The effect results in lower risk strategies which 
lead to lower needs of equity-based incentives to mitigate such agency cost.  The CEO age is 
then use to account for such effects. Additionally, CEO gender is also believed to have an 
impact over executive’s compensation as reported by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003). 
Notwithstanding, in this sample there is only two women included (in the non-family 
sample), which will certainly not be enough to provide any conclusions. Nevertheless a 




Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
Include the summary statistics for the same variables as in Table 1 but introducing the family 
versus non-family control differentiation. The sample consists of 216 firm-year observations 
over years 2000 through 2010 for the family control sample and 3,911 firm-year observations 
over the same period for the non-family control sample. Control variables have a slightly 
reduced sample size as both firm specific and individual CEO characteristics are not available 
for some of the compensation data. Family Control is defined as having a family-member as a 
CEO. 
  Family Control Non-family Control 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Level of CEO compensation (thousands of dollars) 
Salary 216 759.762 748.375 3,911 1,009.147 974.365 
Bonus 216 855.500 400.000 3,911 1,037.650 367.500 
Stock Option 216 11,100.218 2,450.271 3,911 4,757.135 2,320.316 
Restricted Stock 216 921.341 0.0 3,911 2,183.264 196.346 
LTIAs 216 226.234 0.0 3,911 1,563.384 0.0 
Total Compensation 216 13,869.276 5,137.511 3,911 10,588.262 6,589.321 
Cash Compensation 216 1,621.483 1,261.599 3,911 2,084.479 1,462.500 
       Percentage of CEO compensation 
P_Salary (%) 213 0.228 0.129 3,911 0.212 0.145 
P_Bonus (%) 213 0.125 0.066 3,911 0.126 0.062 
P_Option (%) 213 0.504 0.524 3,911 0.388 0.381 
P_RS (%) 213 0.121 0.0 3,911 0.215 0.031 
P_LTIAs (%) 213 0.022 0.0 3,911 0.058 0.0 
              
Delta (thousands of dollars) 
Delta_c 216 173.744 61.052 3,911 119.391 70.667 
Delta_t 216 18,663.919 2,768.062 3,911 1,903.672 612.748 
       Other Variables 
Sales (billions of dollars) 216 8.555 8.292 3,911 8.793 8.725 
Leverage (%) 212 0.116 0.086 3,891 0.238 0.226 
ROA (%) 213 0.182 0.183 3,908 0.154 0.150 
Shareholder Return (%) 214 2.419 0.997 3,847 10.480 1.859 
Stock Return Volatility (%) 216 0.436 0.377 3,911 0.381 0.332 
Gender 216 1 1 3,911 0.980 1 
Tenure  208 15 14 3,870 6.5 5 




The length of a CEO mandate has also divide the literature which point towards a 
combination of conclusions. Higher salaries may be explained by executive’s tenure and not 
by CEOs family connections. McConaughy (2000) follows the argument that considers age 
as a measure of CEOs` experience. The more experience a CEO has, the higher the likelihood 
of getting his salary raised. On the contrary, longer tenures are also associated with 
managerial entrenchment. As Hill & Phan (1991) conclude, the longer an executive has been 
on the job the better he knows how to influence the board and extract private benefits. Such a 
relation is even more important inside family firms as family members will be more 
indisposed to leave his job to an outsider. CEO Tenure is used to control for such effects and 
is defined as number of years a CEO has held his position in the firm.  
Furthermore, a dummy variable was created to control for differences in ownership and 
control. The dummy takes the value of one if a company has ownership and control 
performed by a family. This differential is the base line of the hypothesis tests to be 
performed over Section IV and aims to find enclosure over CEO compensation levels, 
structure and sensitivity in family controlled and non-family controlled.  
Table 2 indicates that family controlled companies pay, on average, more to their CEOs 
than non-family firms. Total compensation for family member CEOs is c. $13.9 million in 
contrast to c. $10.6 million of non-family CEO. Contrariwise, when analysing the typical 
CEO, total compensation is higher for non-family CEOs, which meets the first hypothesis 
test. Stock options remain the largest component for both CEO types, representing around 
50% for family CEOs and about 40% for non-family CEOs. Regarding compensation 
incentives, family CEOs have slightly higher sensitivity over current equity portfolio whereas 




However these interpretations do not control for industry and firm size, recognized to be 
the most important determinants of the level of executive compensation (Jensen & Murphy, 
1988 and Murphy, 1999). Such control variables will then be employed in the empirical tests 
to allow the determination of clearer effects on CEO compensation. The lack of controlling is 
probably going to result in unreliable tests of means as the variables may be systematic 
related. Testing the difference of means between the two samples represents a simple and 
suitable univariate analysis for descriptive purposes. Table 3 reports the mean differences 
between family and non-family control sub samples for compensation, sensitivities and 
control variables, alongside with respective t-statistics significance test. 
As shown in the Table 3, all differences are statistically significantly besides Bonus. 
Family CEOs have significant lower salary, restricted stock and cash compensation than the 
non-family ones. Nonetheless, the relation is inverted with regards to stock options and total 
compensation, where family CEOs earn substantially more.  
Concerning the size of the company, it seems like both natures of CEOs perform in 
similar average sized family companies. Notwithstanding, family controlled firms are, on 
average, less leveraged and reward less their shareholders. Such finding supports the 
argument of family businesses having less leverage due to higher efforts on relying their 
financial strength by building up equity instead of using debt. Such companies also 
outperform on average non-family controlled firms in terms of ROA despite higher average 
stock volatilities.   
 In terms of CEO characteristics, family CEOs tend to be slightly older (56 against 55 
years for non-family CEOs) and seems to stay longer at the leading position of the company 
(15 against 6.5 years for non-family CEOs). The difference of approximately 9 years reflects 




Table 3- Test of Mean Differences  
Reports averages for the control variables in controlled and non-controlled family firms, 
along with the t-statistic testing the difference in means between the two samples. Variables 
are defined in Section ӀӀӀ. The table reports t-statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the industry level in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 





Control       
Variable Mean Mean Difference 
Level of CEO compensation (thousands of dollars) 
Salary 759.762 1,009.147 249.385 *** 
Bonus 855.500 1,037.650 182.150   
Stock Option 11,100.218 4,757.135 -6,343.100 *** 
Restricted Stock 921.341 2,183.264 1261.92 *** 
LTIAs 226.234 1,563.384 1337.15 * 
Total Compensation 13,869.276 10,588.262 -3,281.000 *** 
Cash Compensation 1,621.483 2,084.479 462.996 ** 
            
Delta (thousands of dollars) 
Delta_c 173.744 119.391 -54.353 *** 
Delta_t 18,663.919 1,903.672 -16,760.000 *** 
            
Other Variables 
Sales (billions of dollars) 8.555 8.793 0.238 *** 
Leverage (%) 0.116 0.238 0.122 *** 
ROA (%) 0.182 0.154 -0.028 *** 
Shareholder Return (%) 2.419 10.480 8.061 *** 
Stock Return Volatility (%) 0.436 0.381 -0.055 *** 
Tenure  15.255 6.449 -8.806 *** 





Section IV - Empirical Approach and Results 
In agreement with previous data set employed, this section describes the general 
multidimensional panel data regression model used to measure the relation between executive 
compensation packages and founding family control and present the main results. The first 
sub-section analyse the first two hypotheses and the second sub-section the remaining one.  
To begin with, empirically demonstration that family-controlled firms offer lower total 
compensation to their CEOs` in comparison to non-family controlled firms will be 
performed. Therefore, an OLS regression to estimate total compensation after controlling for 
year, industry effects and firm and CEO characteristics was employed: 
𝐿𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= 𝛼 + 𝛽0 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 
+  𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  
(1) 
The main variable of interest is “Family_Control”, which evaluates the differential of 
compensation of family-controlled executives over those from non-family controlled 
companies. The OLS regression includes firm fixed effects to control for any unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity across firms
13
. The inclusion of fixed effects in the regressions 
allows the identification of firm changes within dependent variables average as a function of 
the independent variables. In addition, standard errors are clustered at the industry-level to 
take into account the fact that residuals may not be independent within industries. 
Furthermore, the structure of such compensation packages will be analysed to test the 
second hypothesis. For this analysis it was employed the same regression as presented in 
                                                 
13
 The simple OLS regressions (without firm fixed effects) are provided in the Appendix (Table A1). 
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Equation (1), using each compensation component as percentage of total compensation as 
depend variable: Salary, Bonus, Options, Restricted Stock (RS) and LTIAs.  
For the third hypothesis, pay-to-performance sensitivity is evaluated by employing the 
incentive measures in place of the compensation components as depended variables. 
 
Section IV.I - Family CEOs compensation structure  
At first, family control feature is considered as to understand to what extension the total 
compensation and its various components will differ when comparing it against non-family 
controlled businesses. In Table 4, regression of the natural logarithm of total compensation as 
well as the fraction of total pay components corresponding to each of the five pay 
components is presented. The regression also includes all discussed control variables and 
firm fixed effects.  
The unpredictable conclusion is that family control does not influence executive 
compensation, contradicting previous family executive compensation literature. Despite 
family control expectations of negative relation with total compensation, statistical evidence 
was not found on this research. Moreover, neither cash nor stock options differ between 
family CEOs versus non-family CEOs inside family business universe. 
Even though null results need to be interpreted with caution, these non-significant 
findings are still important. For example, on a sample of multi-family member firms, Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2003) found that the difference between family and non-family CEOs is caused 
by lower-than-average pay among family CEOs and not from non-family CEOs requirement 
of higher-than-average premium pay. The authors argued that it is the number of family 
members in the board that causes such difference.  
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Table 4 - Firm fixed effect regressions describing changes in the structure of CEO 
compensation between family and non-family controlled firms.  
The sample consists of 3,985 firm-year observations over the 10 year period of 2000 to 2010. 
Log_Total_Comp is the logarithm of the dollar value of total compensation (including salary, 
bonus, stock option, restricted stock, and LTIA and in units of thousands of dollars) for each 
CEO. P_Salary, P_Bonus, P_Option, P_RS, and P_LTIAs are the fractions of total 
compensation coming from those individual components of pay. The independent variables in 
the regressions include an indicator (Family_Control) equal to one for the family-controlled 
firms (which is defined as having a family-member as a CEO) and zero otherwise and other 
control variables that include firm and individual characteristics. Variables are defined in 
Section ӀӀӀ. The table reports t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry level in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant 
at 10%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Log_Total_Comp P_Salary P_Bonus P_Option P_RS P_LTIAs 
              
Family_Control -0.328 0.007 0.001 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.396) (0.079) (0.034) (0.077) (0.043) (0.015) 
Log_Sales 0.226** -0.020 0.013 0.035* -0.045** 0.016 
  (0.101) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) 
ROA 0.732* -0.218*** 0.160** 0.078 0.099 -0.119*** 
  (0.442) (0.064) (0.074) (0.096) (0.081) (0.043) 
Shareholder_Return -0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.747** 0.066 0.001 -0.173*** 0.040 0.066** 
  (0.315) (0.050) (0.031) (0.053) (0.047) (0.027) 
Volatility 0.153 0.005 -0.027 0.371*** -0.244*** -0.105*** 
  (0.182) (0.037) (0.024) (0.049) (0.042) (0.028) 
Tenure -0.005 0.004** 0.001 -0.003 -0.003* 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002** 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender 0.109 -0.002 -0.040 -0.010 0.001 0.051 
  (0.233) (0.038) (0.042) (0.056) (0.067) (0.068) 
              
Observations 3,985 3,985 3,985 3,985 3,985 3,985 
R-squared 0.054 0.060 0.219 0.172 0.363 0.103 
Number of id 414 414 414 414 414 414 
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This argument implies that strategic control family board members exert on family 
CEOs does not extend to non-family-member CEOs. Notwithstanding, the number of family 
members in the company board has not been included has variable due to information 
limitations, namely time and data availability constrains. As a consequence, empirical results 
of the present study do not walk in lockstep with past literature findings mainly due to the 
lack of important control variables that generate biased statistics. Nevertheless, interpretation 
of all significant variables will be undertaken. Likewise, further discussion regarding the 
model limitations and future research opportunities will be provided on Section VI.  
Regarding control variables, there are some results consistent with prior theory and other 
effects that do not follow previous expectations. The interpretation metric used to analyse 
Table 4 is 1% change in the dependent variable will have β% change in the independent 
variable, ceteris paribus, for all firm characteristics. For age and CEO tenure, the change in 
dependent variable is in years. 
The first set of controls, with regards to firm characteristics, present some assorted  
results. Company size has statistically significant relation with total compensation, impacting 
22.6%, and options, 3.5%. Such results go in accordance with Murphy (1999) findings of 
significant positive relation between firm size and compensation. Conversely, restricted stock 
is negatively related with the size of the firm with -4.5%. 
As proposed by Jensen & Murphy (1990a, 1990b), firm performance variables should be 
relevant factors of compensation. In the estimated regressions, ROA has significant positive 
relation with bonus and total compensation. Despite lower significance level, ROA impacts 
73.2% of total compensation and 16% of bonus component. On the contrary, the negative 
strong effect produced on salary constituent, -21.8%, and on LTIAs, -11.9%, is challenging 
previous literature. Shareholder returns also produce a strong negative impact over total 
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compensation and options, however, the effect has no real expression (-0.2% and 0%, 
respectively).  
Regarding volatility effects, a significant impact over options (37.1%), restricted stock (-
24.4%) and LTIAs (-10.5%) is observable. As reviewed before, risk levels have no clear 
empirical expectation regarding executives compensation. Options follow Linck et al. (2009) 
findings which expect family businesses to offer more option compensation to their CEOs in 
order to mitigate the risk associated with higher volatile management. Restricted stock and 
LTIAs results follow Core et al. (1999) conclusions of decreasing CEO equity-based 
compensation when risk levels increase.  
As pointed out early in this study, CEO individual characteristics variables seem to 
either have no statistical significance or, when they do, the magnitude of the effect is residual. 
According with that, tenure has slightly positive effect of 0.4% only over salary and CEO age 
has a negative effect of 0.3% only over LTIAs. 
 Accounting for all results and respective analysis, hypothesis 1 and 2 are not 
corroborated. Hypothesis 1 predicted that family-member CEOs receive less total 
compensation than CEOs of non-family. However, such argument is not supported by 
statistical evidence as deduct over the analysis. Despite having the expected effect, family 
control dummy variable is not statistically significant to explain total compensation levels. 
Moreover, hypothesis 2, which predicted that family-member CEOs have different 
compensation structure, is also not corroborated. Expectations from previous literature 
support the perception of family controlled firms using different compensation structures, 
especially regarding equity-based incentives. Notwithstanding, as referred in the analysis, not 
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only family control dummy variable shows effects very close to null but also demonstrates 
that such effects are statistically insignificant
14
.   
 
Section IV.II - Family CEOs pay-to-performance sensitivity 
Table 5 presents the results of regressions using the incentive measures, in place of the 
compensation components, as dependent variable. Following Guay (1999), the regressions 
include the family control dummy, firm fixed effects and discussed control variables. 
Incentives for current compensation grants and outstanding portfolio of both current and past 
grants of shares and options are examined. Despite the fact that incentives are provided by 
both current and total grants of shares and options, the concern is on how CEO compensation 
changes with regards to family control. Subsequently, current grants represent the proportion 
of outstanding compensation that is directly under control of the boards of directors which 
better represent current trends of compensation packages.  
First column of Table 5 presents the sensitivity of current average CEO compensation to 
changes in firm value (Delta_c). The coefficient estimated on the firm control variable is 
negative and is not statistically significant. Notwithstanding the fact that such result provides 
a coefficient magnitude that confirms the argument of family controlled firms providing 
lower performance-based pay, statistic results indicate that family-control effect is not 





                                                 
14
 A sample split was also employed to control for temporary remuneration changes associated with 2007-2009 
global financial crises (2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2010). Results attained show positive statistically significant 
relation between family control and total salary for the latter sub-period. With regards to options, a negative 
statistically significant relation with family control was observed. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 5 - Firm fixed effect regressions describing changes in CEOs incentive measure 
(Delta) between family and non-family controlled firms.  
The sample consists of 3,988 firm-year observations over the 10 year period of 2000 to 2010. 
The dependent variables in the regressions are sensitivities of current (Delta_c) and total 
(Delta_t) annual equity-based compensation to changes in stock price. The independent 
variables mainly follow Guay (1999). Both variables are defined along Section ӀӀӀ. The table 
reports t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level in 
parentheses. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. 
  (1) (2) 
Variables Delta_c Delta_t 
      
Family_Control -20.984 5,456.080* 
  (37.264) (2,959.917) 
Log_Sales 37.161*** 769.173** 
  (13.599) (299.667) 
ROA -37.740 2,981.201*** 
  (73.083) (1,140.967) 
Shareholder_Return -0.530*** -6.730*** 
  (0.140) (2.285) 
Leverage -45.943 -1,489.510 
  (39.374) (1,831.887) 
Volatility -36.689 264.325 
  (29.182) (495.063) 
Tenure 0.434 173.326*** 
  (1.142) (52.525) 
Age -0.226 -32.776 
  (0.930) (37.040) 
Gender 52.077 225.118 
  (66.396) (380.330) 
Cash_Compensation 0.004** -0.034 
  (0.002) (0.036) 
      
Observations 3,988 3,988 
R-squared 0.034 0.156 




The second column offers calculations using the sensitivity of the CEOs full portfolio of 
current and prior grants of shares and options (Delta_t) as dependent variable. In contrast to 
the results for the current delta, overall pay-to-performance sensitivity appears to have a weak 
positive relation with family control variable. With a coefficient significance of 10%, equity 
holdings of family CEOs appear to be, on average, around $5.5 million more sensitive to a 
1% stock price change than non-family CEO running family firms. Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of the effect indicates a major concentration of CEOs full portfolio sensitivity on 
the distribution right tail (also verifiable by comparing Delta_t mean and median on Table 1) 
which can bias the results. 
Consistent with Core & Guay (1999) argument of larger firms providing greater dollar 
incentives, both Deltas increase with firm size. Surprisingly, ROA have positive effects on 
CEOs´ total portfolio sensitivity. Taking into account that the magnitude of the effect is quite 
expressive, it is believed that such a disruptive result may be a cause of Delta_t distribution 
shape. On the other hand, shareholder return effect follows an expected negative relation with 
pay-to-performance sensitivity measures. As shareholders receive higher returns from their 
investments, they will be more pleased with CEOs performance and less concerned about 
disciplinary control mechanisms. This will result in less remuneration based on performance. 
Total Portfolio pay-to-performance sensitivity is also positively related to CEO tenure. 
Moreover, cash compensation is also statistically significant to explain the sensitivity of 
current average CEO compensation to changes in firm value. However the magnitude of such 
effect is residual.  
With regards to hypothesis 3, concluding remarks are ambiguous. There is no empirical 
evidence that performance-based compensation is influenced by family control. Despite 
lower significance on the sensitivity of total equity-based portfolio, the results were exactly 
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the opposite of what was expected
15
. In other words, hypothesis 3 is also not corroborated by 
main findings of this research.   
  
                                                 
15
 A sample split was also employed to control for temporary remuneration changes associated with 2007-2009 
global financial crises (2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2010). Results attained show positive statistically significant 
relation between family control and current delta for the latter sub-period. Results are available upon request. 
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Section V - Tellabs Inc Case Study 
When Graef Crystal (1998) analyzed CEO Stephen Bollenbach’s compensation at Hilton 
Hotel group the author demonstrated that the compensation of the CEO far exceeded that of 
his predecessor, Barron Hilton, the hotel family founder successor. Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2003) theorized that the difference between family and non-family CEOs compensation 
inside family firms can occur due to non-family CEOs demands of higher than average 
compensation to reward them for the risk of working in a family business. As Coli (2013)     
refer, the mixture between family ties and business activities produces not only a unique 
strength of strategic opportunities, but also an equal amount of risks and uncertainties that 
can seriously impact the equilibrium of the company itself. The author identifies several risks 
related to governance structure, growth strategy implementation and financing costs, among 
others, that may lead to non-family members demand for higher compensation. 
In this section all CEO replacements occurred inside the defined sample used on section 
IV were selected. Figure 1 represents the year distribution of all the 29 CEO replacements 
that occurred between 2000 and 2010. The objective is to understand, through a direct 
comparison analysis, if when a family CEO is replaced by a non-family CEO, the last one 
will derive. Tellabs was chosen to be the particular case to be investigated in this analysis 
which intends to study to what extent a CEO replacement represents an executive 
compensation policy change. Following Graef Crystal (1998) study, the replacement of one a 
family CEO by a non-family CEO is expect to derive higher total compensation for the later 
one. The reverse mechanism, i.e., from non-family CEO to family CEO, will also be taken 
into consideration.  
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It is immediately observable that family to non-family replacements are more likely to 
happened than the reverse shift (24 against 5 replacements, respectively). From 2000 to 2006, 
the time period before the global financial crisis
16
, more CEO replacements from family to 
non-family occurred possibly driven by a generally strong business growth stage where 
family firms were willing to take the next step and hire external CEOs to further improve 
their company performance (Block, 2009). Following the annual distribution, Tellabs 
contributes to 3 of those 29 events changing from family to non-family and from non-family 
to family and back to non-family during the 10 year period.  
Tellabs is a global network technology provider that focuses on developing and 
delivering passive Optical Local Area Network (OLAN) and broadband access solutions for a 
wide variety of customers. Founded and run by Michael J. Birck, Tellabs presents a perfect 
case study for my direct comparison showing 3 CEO replacements that can be used to assess 
                                                 
16
 The financial crisis of 2007–08, also known as the global financial is considered by many economists to have 
been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. (Reuters, February 29, 2009). The 
collapse of large financial institutions was a constant threat which was only prevented by the bailout of some 
important banks by national governments. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, 
declines in consumer wealth, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–12 global recession.  
Figure 1 – Year distribution of CEO replacements  
The sample covers 29 CEO replacements, 24 of them being from family to non-
family and 5 from non-family to family during sample period 2000-2010. 
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the respective impact over compensation packages. Figure 2 presents the annual distribution 







Following the dot-com bubble
17
 in 2000, Tellabs CEO, Michael Birck had a 
compensation package of $968 thousand mainly comprised of fixed salary (c.68%) and bonus 
(c.32%). During 2001 the first replacement took place and the company became led by a non-
family CEO, Mr. Richard C. Notebaert, credited for saving Qwest from bankruptcy. By 
analyzing Graph 1 it is possible to notice a significant increase in CEO total compensation of 
approximately 351% to $4,364 million. In addition, the structure of compensation altered 
from the referred salary and bonus to a salary (c.13%) and options (c.87%). 
However, Richard Notebaert was substituted one year after due to poor results and the 
former CEO Michael Birck took place again. As the company became family-controlled 
again, the compensation scheme also suffered changes and the total remuneration was 
brought back to similar past levels: $1,623 million of total compensation being comprised 
c.30% by fixed salary and c.70% of options. Mr. Birck remained on the top position of the 
                                                 
17
 The dot-com bubble is a historic speculative bubble covering roughly 1997–2000 period (with a climax on 
10
th
 of March, 2000) during which industrialized nations stock markets saw their equity value rise rapidly from 
growth in the internet sector and related fields. 
Family to non-family 
Non-family to family 
Figure 2 - Year distribution of Tellabs CEO compensation  
The graph contains the total compensation evolution over the 10 year period of 2000 to 2010. 
Total compensation is expressed in units of thousands of dollars and includes all 
compensation components (salary, bonus, stock option, restricted stock, and LTIA) 




management of Tellabs for 2 following years and compensation levels remained similar in 
such period.  
Mr. Krish Prabhu, former chief operating officer of Alcatel, took over as CEO in 
February 2004 and represents the last change regarding family ownership. As observed in the 
first replacement with a non-family CEO, compensation package suffered significant 
changes. Total compensation sky rocked to $4,094 million and compensation structure also 
altered to a different scheme: salary became less significant to c.17.5%, options remained as 
the most important component with approximately 55.5%, bonus was reintroduced but with a 
small percentage around 2.5% and restricted stock was introduced in the package with an 
expression of c.24.5%. 
Until 2005 total compensation kept on the same trend registering only an increase of 4%, 
whereas compensation structure varied  slightly towards a package with more weight on 
bonus (c.12%) and less weight on restricted stock (c.12.5%). Mr. Prabhu stepped down only 
in March 2008 for personal reasons but the executive compensation package suffered 
significant changes from 2005 to 2006. However, the reason behind such job position shifts 
was related to the restructuring program Tellabs was employing to reduce costs which also 
covered CEO compensation package.  
Between 2006 and 2010, executive total compensation evolved in a smooth yet increased 
pace reflecting good management results achieved during the period. The amount went from 
$2,376 million to $3,078 million during the referred period which results in a CAGR
18
 of 
6.69%. With regards to compensation structure, bonuses and options decreased magnitude 
until 2008 and gained more expression from 2008 onwards. Fixed salary also decreased from 
2008 onwards with the same effect being observable for restricted stock. Also denote that 
LTIAs were never used by Tellabs as part of compensation scheme. 
                                                 
18
 CAGR is the short name for Compounding Annual Growth Rate. 
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This analysis presents evidence that supports the family control incentive alignment 
hypothesis. As referred, such hypothesis states that family CEOs possess superior incentives 
and have less need to receive additional incentives through their compensation from the firm. 
From what is observable on this simple analysis, the founding-family CEO is paid less when 
comparing to the non-founding-family CEO. 
In line with McConaughy (2000), the results achieved may suggest that family-
controlled firms have to pay nonfamily CEOs more to incentive them to perform at the same 
level that a family CEO would do. In other words, when Tellabs replaced its founding CEO, 
compensation levels have raised dramatically which might suggest that differences between 
family and nonfamily CEO compensation schemes do exist. Additionally, with regards to the 
control variables identified in section V as statically significant to explain total 
compensation
19
, it was observed that none of such variables change significantly to cause 
such variation of total compensation.  
On the other hand, when Mr. Birck got back to the CEO position, executive 
compensation levels significantly decreased and company results do not necessarily follow 
that trend. Such results suggest that intrafamily job market may provide lower executive 
compensation levels. According to Dekop (1988), founders and internally promoted CEOs 
receive less pay than CEOs recruited from outside of the firm. Family-member CEOs do not 
have to be attracted out of the CEO labor market, hired, retained, and given incentives which 
result in a lower total compensation levels. Moreover these results also suggest that founding 
family executives and compensation advisors to family-controlled firms should be sensitive 
to the fact that compensation costs may rise when outside CEOs or other top, nonfamily, 
executives are hired.  
  
                                                 
19
 Positive relation with firm size (measured by the logarithm of total sales) and firm performance (measured by 
ROA) and negative relation with leverage and shareholder returns (the later variable will not be considered in 
this analysis as it only has residual impact over compensation (-0.2%). Results are available upon request. 
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Section VI - Conclusions and Discussion 
This section is dedicated to concluding remarks extracted from all analysis conducted 
and pointing out to further discussions and future opportunities in family business 
compensation researches. Past literature has covered many aspects that help explain executive 
compensation the best example being the model developed by Combs & Skill (2003) that 
estimates the majority of the differences between family and non-family executives.  
The major factors are attributed to firm size (Tosi et al., 2000), firm performance and 
other CEO job characteristics (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). CEO individual characteristics 
such as power over the compensation process or individual human capital
20
 also influences 
the compensation packages (Combs & Skill, 2003). In addition, ownership concentration, 
large institutional investors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987) and CEO job market (Ezzamel & 
Watson, 1998) also demonstrate a significant effect on compensation. Likewise, the current 
focus regarding CEO compensation determinants is the amount of family representation. 
Compared to total pay, much less is known about factors that affect the amount of 
option-based compensation offered. Despite Jensen & Murphy (1990a) study regarding the 
fact that firms offer less stock option compensation than agency theory might predict, the 
knowledge about how option-based compensation is still far from consensus.  
The foundations of this study build on agency and stewardship theory arguments to 
explain the effect of family representation on CEO compensation. Methodically, the 
empirical analysis is aimed to confirm existing theory with regards to family incentive 
alignment hypothesis in family controlled businesses within U.S. publicly stock traded 
companies’ universe. Without using non-family firms as a reference point, the mathematical 
regressions conclude that family control do not present statistical significance impact over 
                                                 
20
 Networks, knowledge, intellectual property, patents, teams, among others. 
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total compensation, compensation structure and pay to performance sensitivity. However 
such conclusions should be evaluated with some concerns. 
The assumptions designed to define the data sample can bias the results and produce 
misleading implications. As stated by Westhead & Cowling (1998), family business research 
is sensitive to how family influence is defined. The family business definition employed in 
this research followed previous studies (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003), yet, such broad 
definition does not reflect the true family influence over compensation. Moreover, recent 
literature has found new insights regarding levels of family representation that better explains 
compensation differences. Following Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) discovers on executive 
compensation inside family firms, the authors define the type of family representativeness in 
the firm as the critical fact determining lower compensation levels of family-member CEOs. 
Results obtained by the authors corroborate that family-member CEOs of family firms with 
multiple family representatives receive lower total compensation. However, when the family-
member CEO is the only family member involved, total compensation increases relative to 
CEOs at non-family firms.  
It is intuitive to question why the number of family-members represented in management 
or on the board should influence family CEOs when they have strong incentives towards 
stewardship behaviours that lead to acceptance of lower compensations. Logical thinking 
argues that it should not matter how many family members are represented in the board. 
Conversely, agency theory suggests that one reason that family-member CEOs accept lower 
pay than non-family CEOs in firms with multiple family representatives is due to the fact that 
their compensation is supervised by the other family members. 
 The researcher´s hypothesis is that the additional family representatives engage in 
strategic control by evaluating CEO decision-making and monitoring the compensation 
process. In consequence, family-member CEOs become more willing to adopt stewardship 
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orientations and accept lower compensation on behalf of other benefits. In line with this 
argument is the inference from Combs et al. (2009) demonstrating that family-member CEOs 
compensation will increase when there are no other family representatives involved. The 
explanation relies on the fact that without family supervision, incentives for stewardship 
behaviours will diminish and family-CEOs will seek as much compensation as possible. As 
stated by agency theory and supported by studies as Villalonga & Amit (2006) and Young et 
al. (2008), family-CEOs would enjoy the full benefits of greater compensation but only bear 
the costs in proportion to their ownership shares.  
Notwithstanding, data on the magnitude of family representation is not easily available 
and it was not possible to collect and incorporate into the regression model. Hiding such 
controls21 from the regressions limits the interpretation and veracity of the results achieved 
in this study and thus presenting opportunities for future research. If the purpose of family 
business research is to understand how family component impacts firms compensation policy, 
the suggestion would be to build a body of knowledge around the unique features of firms 
with multiple family representatives versus lone-family members. Such segmentation will 
allow a more reasonable comparison inside family controlled firms and consequent inference 
about the real determinants of compensation difference.
                                                 
21
 Other controls may be related to US regulation regarding executive compensation for U.S. publicly traded 





Salary - The variable is the dollar value of salary. 
Bonus - The variable is the dollar value of bonus plus target value of non-equity incentive-
plan compensation; (if reported as nonzero).  
Stock options (current grant) - Stock options are valued at fiscal year-end, so the stock price 
we use is the market price at fiscal year-end. In the calculation, I use 0.7 times the period 
between grant date and option expiration date as the option term, assuming a grant date of 1
st 
of July of that year. 
Stock options (prior grant) - I follow Core and Guay (2002) to approximately estimate delta 
for prior grants. 
Restricted stock (current grant) - The variable is the dollar value of restricted stock. By 
dividing this number by the fiscal year end stock price, I estimate the approximate number of 
shares of restricted stock granted. 
Restricted stock (prior grant) - This variable also includes common stock holdings. 
Long-term incentive awards (LTIAs) (current grant) - By multiplying this number by the 
fiscal year-end stock price, I compute the value of stock granted under LTIAs. 
LTIAs (prior grant) – I assume that the CEO holds each year's new grant for the time period 
of LT_PERIOD. I then use this number as the approximate value for prior LTIA grant. By 
dividing this number by the fiscal year end stock price, I estimate the number of shares of 
stock granted under LTIAs. 
P_Salary - Dollar value of salary/dollar value of total compensation including salary, bonus, 
stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive awards. 
P_Bonus - Dollar value of bonus/dollar value of total compensation including salary, bonus, 
stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive awards. 
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P_Option - Dollar value of stock options/dollar value of total compensation including salary, 
bonus, stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive awards. 
P_RS - Dollar value of restricted stock/dollar value of total compensation including salary, 
bonus, stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive awards. 
P_LTIA - Dollar value of long-term incentive awards/dollar value of total compensation 
including salary, bonus, stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive awards. 
Delta_c - (Black-Scholes Delta of all current option grants + number of shares of current 
restricted stock grants + number of targeted shares granted under LTIA) × (fiscal year-end 
price × 0.01). 
Delta_t - (Black-Scholes Delta of all current option grants + number of shares of current 
restricted stock grants + number of targeted shares granted under LTIA + Black-Scholes 
Delta of all prior option grants + number of prior shares of restricted stock + number of prior 
shares granted under LTIA) × (fiscal year-end price × 0.01). 
Black-Scholes Delta of options - First partial derivative of value of option with respect to 
stock price (Stock Return Volatility). 
Family Control - Dummy that equals 1 if CEO belongs to the family. 
Sales - Total sales in thousands of U.S. dollars.   
Leverage - Book value of long term plus current debt divided by total assets. 
ROA - Net income divided by total assets. 
Shareholder Returns - Change in stock price over the year plus dividends paid divided by the 
stock price at the start of the year. 
Stock Return Volatility - Annualized standard deviation of daily stock return. 
Age - Age of CEO in years. 
Gender - CEOs gender. 
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Tenure  - Number of years as top executive in the firm. 
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Table A1 - Simple OLS estimation describing changes in the structure of CEO compensation between family and non-family controlled firms.  
The sample consists of 4,124 firm-year observations over the 10 year period of 2000 to 2010. Some equations have a reduced sample size as both firm specific and individual 
CEO characteristics are not available for some of the compensation data. Log_Total_Comp is the logarithm of the dollar value of total compensation (including salary, 
bonus, stock option, restricted stock, and LTIA and in units of thousands of dollars) for each CEO. P_Salary, P_Bonus, P_Option, P_RS, and P_LTIAs are the fractions of 
total compensation coming from those individual components of pay. The independent variables in the regressions include an indicator (Family_Control) equal to one for the 
family-controlled firms (which is defined as having a family-member as a CEO) and zero otherwise and other control variables that include firm and individual 





= significant at 5%, 
* 
= significant at 10%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Log_Total_Comp Log_Total_Comp Log_Total_Comp P_Salary P_Salary P_Salary P_Bonus P_Bonus P_Bonus 
                    
Family_Control -0.067 -0.056 0.027 0.026 0.031 -0.005 0.014 0.013 -0.001 
  (0.206) (0.191) (0.219) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log_Sales 0.322*** 0.361*** 0.352*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.032*** 0.012** 0.010* 0.011* 




































































































         Observations 4,124 4,029 3,985 4,124 4,029 3,985 4,124 4,029 3,985 





Table A1- (Continuation) 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Variables P_Option P_Option P_Option P_RS P_RS P_RS P_LTIAs P_LTIAs P_LTIAs 
           
Family_Control 0.060 0.043 0.068 -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.053** -0.022*** -0.020** -0.009 
  (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Log_Sales -0.004 0.023** 0.023** 0.010 -0.009 -0.012 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA  0.141 0.138  -0.086 -0.070  -0.139*** -0.138*** 
   (0.086) (0.088)  (0.073) (0.073)  (0.037) (0.037) 
Shareholder_Return  -0.001*** -0.001***  0.001*** 0.001***  0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.172*** -0.181***  0.136*** 0.127***  0.037* 0.039* 
   (0.047) (0.048)  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.022) (0.021) 
Volatility  0.328*** 0.326***  -0.185*** -0.184***  -0.105*** -0.106*** 
   (0.048) (0.047)  (0.040) (0.040)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Tenure   -0.001   -0.002   -0.001* 
    (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Age   -0.002   0.000   0.000 
    (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Gender   0.007   -0.040   0.036 
    (0.050)   (0.054)   (0.029) 
          
Observations (0.080) (0.087) (0.111) (0.062) (0.075) (0.102) (0.030) (0.042) (0.057) 
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